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Prosocial acts benefitting others are widespread amongst humans. By contrast, chimpanzees have failed to
demonstrate such a disposition in several studies, leading some authors to conclude that the forms of
prosociality studied evolved in humans since our common ancestry. However, similar prosocial behavior
has since been documented in other primates, such as capuchin monkeys. Here, applying the same
methodology to humans, chimpanzees, and capuchins, we provide evidence that all three species will display
prosocial behavior, but only in certain conditions. Fundamental forms of prosociality were age-dependent
in children, conditional on self-beneficial resource distributions even at age seven, and conditional on social
or resource configurations in chimpanzees and capuchins. We provide the first evidence that experience of
conspecific companions’ prosocial behavior facilitates prosocial behavior in children and chimpanzees.
Prosocial actions were manifested in all three species following rules of contingency that may reflect
strategically adaptive responses.
A
regard for the welfare of others is seen as one of the cardinal human virtues. Such prosocial dispositions
show some cultural variation1,2, but humans often demonstrate extreme levels of selflessness, such as
charitable contributions to anonymous strangers3. By contrast, several recent studies have concluded that
such dispositions are lacking in our closest relatives, chimpanzees. In an influential experiment4, chimpanzee
subjects could choose to pull either of two shelves, both of which delivered identical food items to themselves, but
only one of which also delivered food to a second chimpanzee. Finding that the presence or absence of a social
partner did not influence the choice chimpanzees made, the authors concluded that this form of prosocial
resource donation is a unique disposition that has evolved in the human species since the split with the common
chimpanzee/human ancestor (see also ref. 5).
Such a conclusion might be judged premature because the authors offered no comparative data demonstrating
that children or other human participants would have behaved differently in their paradigm. There is also a range
of experimental and observational evidence for other kinds of prosocial responses by chimpanzees6 in relation to
familiar humans7 and to conspecifics8, both in captivity9 and the wild10,11. Moreover, when children were even-
tually tested in experiments using the aforementioned paradigm4, young children, aged 3–4 years old, also failed
to show prosocial responses12. Not until children were 7–8 years old did they do so; a striking discovery since
replicated using a protocol based on the chimpanzee paradigm adapted for children13.
Such findings suggest prosociality of the kind identified in these studies might be shaped by years of experience
of cultural practices in children’s families and wider society. In turn this raises the question of whether prosocial
behavior may be facilitated in non-human primates when they experience such behavior in their community.
There is increasing evidence that non-human primate behavior can be profoundly changed by social learning14–16
and that cultural transmission shapes a particularly rich array of chimpanzee behavior patterns in the wild17,18, a
conclusion supported by controlled experimental evidence for the transmission ofmultiple, short-term traditions
in captive chimpanzee communities19–21. Although most of this evidence concerns foraging and tool use, there is
observational evidence from the wild that social learning in primates can also affect social dispositions, such as
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lowered aggression22, and there is experimental evidence for such
effects enhancing conciliatory dispositions after fights, and affiliative
behavior more generally23,24. Taking this broad array of evidence
concerning primate social learning into account, we designed what
we believe are the first studies to test whether prosocial behavior in
children, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys may be shaped by
experiences of prosocial behavior displayed by others.
We explicitly investigated this by first obtaining baseline data on
prosocial responses of participants (human children and adults,
chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys), implementing the original
method of Silk, et al.4 in as comparable a manner as possible; in a
second phase, participants then experienced prosocial behavior by a
new conspecific partner; finally, their own responses were then re-
tested in a third phase with their original partner from phase one.
We considered two alternative ways in which participants might
experience the prosocial behavior of others. In the ‘triadic’ case, as
third parties, they would observe the prosocial behavior of one par-
ticipant towards another; in the ‘dyadic’ case, they would themselves
experience the effects of prosocial behavior by another individual.
We had sufficient chimpanzee and capuchin participants available
for only one of these and chose the dyadic alternative to test first, for
two main reasons. First, we reasoned that directly benefitting from
the prosocial behavior of another individual should provide themost
powerful experience. If this is the case, this is the preferred option for
this first experimental test of the influence of social learning on
prosociality.
The second reason lay in relevance to recent theoretical analyses
of the evolutionary roots of altruistic behavior. Altruistic behavior
among unrelated individuals has long been understood as a viable
outcome of repeated cycles of ‘direct reciprocity’ in which an
altruistic act of individual A towards individual B is reciprocated
by an altruistic act of B towards A, and so on. However in prin-
ciple, altruism can be supported by ‘indirect reciprocity’, which in
turn comes in two forms25. In one, having helped B, A is more
likely to be helped by others. This process, dependent on A’s
prosocial reputation being monitored by others, has been called
‘downstream indirect reciprocity.’ By contrast, in ‘upstream reci-
procity’ B responds to an altruistic act received from A by becom-
ing more likely to direct an altruistic act towards other individuals.
This latter phenomenon was initially labeled ‘generalized recipro-
city’26. The scientific priority of this term ought perhaps to favor
adopting it, but the contrast of ‘upstream’ versus ‘downstream’
indirect reciprocity is also instructive. We therefore favor preser-
vation of both labels.
While at first, it is less easy to appreciate how upstream indirect
reciprocity can be favored by natural selection compared to the
downstream process, modeling analyses have demonstrated its
theoretical viability25,27,28. However, despite its theoretical import-
ance, only one empirical study (with rats) appears so far to have
offered empirical data consistent with such a system28. Such results
remain to be replicated in non-human species. Our experimental
design addressed this because we arranged that in our experimental
phase 2, each participant would experience prosocial acts directed
towards itself by a conspecific, then, in phase 3, be tested for
enhanced prosocial responses towards the individual that they were
paired with in the earlier baseline phase 1.
Our major aims were therefore first, to study prosociality for three
particularly relevant species in as comparable a fashion as possible,
and second, to test the impact of experiencing prosocial behavior on
later prosocial opportunities. We chose chimpanzees as our primary
study species, because several studies have confirmed the lack of
prosocial responses in varieties of the paradigm used by Silk et
al.5,29,30, yet there is evidence that chimpanzees may show strong
social learning effects16,19,20 that might change these prosocial dispo-
sitions. Additionally, one chimpanzee study has recorded prosocial
food donation in a related experimental design, although this
involved a token exchange paradigm that bears less relationship to
real-life scenarios in which food is directly offered31.
We included child samples for comparison, initially incorporating
the age range of 4–8 years, over which previous studies have indi-
cated a significant change in the occurrence of prosocial resource
donation12,13. We attempted to apply to children as similar a para-
digm to the chimpanzees’ as possible, given limitations in earlier
studies. In the first of these12, there had been no other child present
when participant children made their choices (they were instead told
that whatever was donated would be taken and given to another
child). In the second13, the experiments were introduced as a ‘game’
and it appeared some children treated it as such, laughing when they
withheld donation. The results we obtained with children led us
additionally to include an adult human sample to provide a broader
ontogenetic perspective.
We incorporated capuchin monkeys as a third subject population,
because a prior study recorded a prosocial disposition using the two-
shelves paradigm32, yet this was a small effect (,65% prosocial
choices against 50% by chance) and accordingly, the species is an
apt candidate for testing effects of experiencing prosocial resource
donation by others. Studies of other species of monkey have found
some evidence of prosocial choices using variations on this
paradigm33.
In all three species, we incorporated into our Phase 1 baseline
testing, species-appropriate variant conditions that would poten-
tially influence the propensity to display prosocial responses. In chil-
dren, we incorporated both a young age group (5 years) and an older
one (7 years), predicting on the basis of prior research that prosoci-
ality would be seen only in the older group. Such age contrasts were
not an option for the capuchin or chimpanzee samples available. For
chimpanzees, the testing rooms offered the option to have pairs of
individuals either separated or not. Predicting that the immediacy of
the latter configuration might elicit prosocial responses hitherto
reported as absent in this species, we contrasted these two config-
urations. Finally, we hypothesized that, as for marmosets34, food
rewards appeared to be acting as a prepotent stimulus for capuchins,
distracting subjects from making decisions that would or would not
provision the other monkey, so we predicted that allowing monkeys
to obtain their own reward, only after choosing between prosocial
and non-prosocial options, might make the former choice more
likely.
To first establish the level of prosociality of our participants in the
baseline trials, we followed a protocol similar to Lakshminarayanan
and Santos32. ‘Proposer’ and ‘Receiver’ individuals sat next to one
another and faced a pair of shelves, vertically stacked and each baited
with two rewards, one in front of each participant (Fig. 1). The
Proposer--the focal experimental individual--had a choice of pulling
one of two shelves, both of which delivered one reward to themselves
and one to their test partner (the Receiver). Although both indivi-
duals always got a food item, the quality of the item varied.
Depending on the shelf that the Proposer pulled, they either deliv-
ered a ‘more preferred reward’ (MPR - e.g. a high value food for the
non-human primates) or a ‘less preferred reward’ (LPR – e.g. a low
value food item; see Fig. 1) to their partner, the Receiver, whereas the
two shelves on the Proposer’s side always contained two identical
rewards. In half the trials the Proposer’s side held two MPRs and in
the other half two LPRs.
Each Proposer participated in a counterbalanced series of trials
presenting (i) ‘Prosocial’ options, where a Receiver could gain either
amore preferred or a less preferred reward depending on which shelf
the Proposer chose to pull; (ii) ‘Empty control’ trials with no Receiver
present; or (iii) ‘Self-centered’ trials in which there was no Receiver
present and the Proposer could reach across and take whichever
reward they delivered on the Receiver’s side. Delivering the MPR
to the Receiver’s side more in condition (i) than (ii) was taken to
indicate a prosocial disposition, while (iii) served both to check that
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Figure 1 | Prosocial responses of chimpanzees, humans and capuchins. The Y-axis represents the proportion of MPR pulled by the Proposer for the
Receiver and the bars are marginal mean and standard deviation estimated from the statistical model. Graphs column 1, MPR for Proposer; column 2:
LPR for Proposer. Empty (E)5 Receiver absent; Prosocial (P)5 Receiver present; Self (S)5 Self-centered scenario, Receiver absent and Proposer access
to Receiver compartment rewards. Blue chart bars 5 significantly different to Empty condition. Green-framed graphs indicate a significant prosocial
response (Prosocial . Empty). Drawings by Jason Zampol.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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the Proposer understood the consequences of their choice (e.g., that
it delivered a reward to the Receiver’s side) and to indicate the
strength of any prosocial disposition compared to the ‘self-centered’
choices they made in this third condition (see Methods for further
details).
After establishing the initial prosocial disposition of each
Proposer-Receiver pair, participants were exposed in Phase 2 to a
new partner who was trained to always choose the prosocial option.
In Phase 3, participants were then re-tested using the same procedure
and control conditions as in Phase 1 (see Methods for more details).
The application of this procedure allowed us to measure the effect on
the Proposer of exposure to a conspecific individual making proso-
cial choices and to compare that effect across species and, for
humans, across developmental periods. It is important to note that
any prosocial effects cannot be explained by direct reciprocation,
because when re-tested as Proposers in Phase 3, participants were
not partnered with the individual who had earlier acted prosocially
towards them (in Phase 2).
In summary, we tested two broad sets of hypotheses. The first,
addressed in the Phase 1 baseline trials, was whether prosociality was
evidenced and varied according to the different conditions (age for
the children; social and resource configurations for the chimpanzees
and capuchins). The second concerned the effects of experiencing
prosocial behavior in the intervention of Phase 2, assessed by com-
paring responses in the re-testing of Phase 3 with those in the base-
line Phase 1.
Results
Developmental and evolutionary origins of prosociality. Results
from the baseline phase of testing (Fig. 1) revealed conditional
prosociality in all three species, but the conditionality took
different forms. In humans, two factors affected the occurrence of
prosocial behavior: age and relative reward magnitude (sex and
friendship had small, non-significant effects; see Supplementary
Information). Young children did not show significant prosocial
tendencies: their tendency to deliver the desirable reward, the
MPR, to the Receiver side was significantly greater in the self-
centered condition than in the empty and prosocial conditions.
This was true both when the Proposer got the more- (x2 5 4.03, df
5 1, p5 0.05 and x25 4.14, df5 1, p5 0.04 respectively) and less-
preferred rewards (x25 12.46, df5 1, p5 0.001 and x25 20.00, df5
1, p 5 0.001 respectively). However, the Proposer’s choices in the
prosocial condition were not significantly different from their
choices when the Receiver was absent (Empty control trials MPR:
x2 5 0.03, df 5 1, p 5 0.86; LPR: x2 5 0.02, df 5 1, p 5 0.88; all
comparisons are illustrated in Fig. 1). In contrast, the older children
delivered the MPR to the Receiver’s side more often in the prosocial
than the empty condition when they themselves received the MPR
(x25 12.58, df5 1, p5 0.001), but not when they received the LPR
(x25 0.87, df5 1, p5 0.35). In this group, the Proposer’s choices in
the self-centered condition were also significantly different from
those in the empty condition (x2 5 16.72, df 5 1, p 5 0.001), but
not from those in the prosocial condition (x2 5 1.55, df 5 1, p 5
0.21) when the Proposer received the MPR, but were different from
both when the Proposer received the LPR (x2 5 29.00, df 5 1, p 5
0.001 and x25 20.00, df5 1, p5 0.001 respectively). Finally, adults
donated the MPR to the Receiver more in the prosocial than the
empty condition, both when the Proposer received the MPR and
the LPR (x2 5 51.09, df 5 1, p 5 0.001 and x2 5 22.89, df 5 1,
p 5 0.001 respectively). In both cases, choices in the self-centered
condition were also significantly different from the empty condition
(MPR: x25 35.97, df5 1, p5 0.001 and LPR: x25 20.49, df5 1, p5
0.001), whereas they differed from the prosocial condition only in the
MPR (x25 9.92, df5 1, p5 0.001), not LPR (x25 0.27, df5 1, p5
0.60). These results show a progressive development of prosocial
behavior, from its absence in young children, to its full expression
in adults, such that adults gave their partner the more preferred
reward, even when they themselves only received the less preferred
reward.
Considering the chimpanzees, we found that Proposers chose the
prosocial option only when both Proposer and Receiver had a barrier
between them (the ‘separated’ condition) and so long as they also
received aMPR themselves (like the older children). In the separated
condition, chimpanzees chose the prosocial option more in the pro-
social condition than the empty control when they received an MPR
(x25 12.04, df5 1, p5 0.001), but not when they received an LPR
(x2 5 2.12, df 5 1, p 5 0.15; all comparisons illustrated in Fig. 1).
When the Proposer received an MPR, choices in the self-centered
condition did not differ from the empty condition, but did from the
prosocial condition (x25 3.34, df5 1, p5 0.07 and x25 5.95, df5 1,
p 5 0.02 respectively), whereas in LPR it differed from both (x2 5
9.86, df5 1, p5 0.001 and x25 5.51, df5 1, p5 0.02 respectively).
When chimpanzees were tested in the same enclosure, without a
barrier between them, there were no differences in their responses
across conditions (in MPR, empty vs. prosocial: x2 5 0.36, df 5 1,
p 5 0.55; empty vs. self-centered: x2 5 0.00, df 5 1, p 5 1.00;
prosocial vs. self-centered: x25 0.06, df5 1, p5 0.81; in LPR, empty
vs. prosocial: x25 0.09, df5 1, p5 0.76; empty vs. self-centered: x2
5 0.61, df5 1, p5 0.43; prosocial vs. self-centered: x25 0.11, df5 1,
p 5 0.74).
Finally, capuchin Proposers showed no evidence of prosocial tend-
encies in the MPR or LPR conditions (other factors, such as age, sex
and social proximity had no significant effects, see Supplementary
Information). When receiving an MPR, Proposers’ choices in the
self-centered condition were different from those in the prosocial
condition (x25 4.87, df5 1, p5 0.03), but not the empty condition
(x2 5 0.28, df 5 1, p 5 0.60; all comparisons illustrated in Fig. 1).
Choices in the prosocial and empty conditions did not differ (x2 5
0.59, df5 1, p5 0.44).When receiving an LPR, Proposers’ choices in
the self-centered condition differed from the empty and prosocial
conditions (x25 15.86, df5 1, p5 0.001 and x25 12.27, df5 1, p5
0.001 respectively), but there was no difference in choices between
these latter two conditions (x25 1.74, df5 1, p5 0.19). Given that
these results differed from those found in a previous study32 we
decided to explore further this lack of prosociality by conducting a
follow up study. We tested 3 hypotheses: (i) that a reduction of the
difference between the MPR and LPR reward would make the capu-
chins less reluctant to give the MPR to the Receiver and thereby
increase their prosocial tendencies; (ii) that the difference between
theMPR and LPR on the Receiver’s side was not well recognized and
therefore that removing the LPR on the Receiver side would increase
their prosocial tendencies; finally, (iii) that the presence of food
facing the Proposer distracted him/her from the Receiver’s side of
the apparatus and that delaying the reward for the Proposer would
increase their prosociality. However, we found evidence of a proso-
cial response in this species only when the capuchins received an
MPR after pulling in a shelf (see Fig. 1 and Supplementary
Information for more details on tests of hypothesis iii and for the
results of tests of hypotheses i and ii). Capuchins were more likely to
deliver an MPR to the Receiver side in the self-centered condition
(Mean5 .85, SE5 .054) compared to the prosocial condition (Mean
5 .63, SE 5 .043, x2 5 6.43, df 5 1, p 5 0.01) and to the empty
condition (Mean 5 .55, SE 5 .022; x2 5 10.23, df 5 1, p 5 0.001).
Delivery of the MPR to the Receiver was also significantly more
frequent in the prosocial than the empty conditions (x2 5 4.20,
df 5 1, p 5 0.04).
Influence of social experience on prosociality. Results are
illustrated in Fig. 2. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to
be prosocial after experiencing another chimpanzee consistently
making prosocial choices. This was true both when the Proposer
received an MPR (x2 5 8.68, df 5 1, p 5 0.003) and an LPR (x2 5
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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7.08, df5 1, p5 0.008). Comparatively, 7-year-old children showed
increased prosociality, but only in the condition where the Proposer
received an MPR (x2 5 4.56, df 5 1, p 5 0.003), not when they
received an LPR (x2 5 0.30, df 5 1, p 5 0.59). Finally, there was
no evidence that experiencing prosociality from another individual
in either the MPR or LPR trials affected the responses of capuchin
monkeys (MPR: x25 1.40, df5 1, p5 0.24 and LPR: x25 0.93, df5
1, p5 0.33) or 5-year-old children (MPR: x25 0.43, df5 1, p5 0.51
and LPR: x25 0.26, df5 1, p5 0.61). Given their baseline responses,
adults did not experience Phases 2 and 3.
To test the possibility that the results of social experience emerged
purely through an increase in delivery of the MPR to the Receiver
side, we compared the results obtained during the first and second
block of the first testing phase. A categorical variable representing the
two blocks had a small and non-significant effect when added to the
GEE with condition, reward, and their interaction. This was true for
the capuchin monkeys (x2 5 0.69, df 5 1, p 5 .41) and the chim-
panzees (separate condition, x2 5 0.45, df 5 1, p 5 0.50; together
condition, x2 5 0.60, df 5 1, p 5 0.44). This result shows that the
delivery of the MPR to the Receiver did not differ significantly
between blocks across all three conditions (empty, prosocial and
self-centered). Focusing only on the prosocial condition during the
first testing phase, aGEEwith only the block variable showed that the
prosocial response of capuchins (x2 5 1.48, df 5 1, p 5 0.22) and
chimpanzees (separate condition, x2 5 2.11, df 5 1, p 5 0.15;
together condition, x2 5 2.48, df 5 1, p 5 0.12) did not differ
significantly between blocks.
These results demonstrate a role for social experience in increasing
prosocial behavior in older children and in our closest relative, the
chimpanzee. Like the younger children, capuchins failed to show
such an effect.
We also compared performance in the prosocial test condition to
the two control conditions after the social learning phase (testing
phase 2) using the same model as we used for the first testing phase
(Fig. 3). The results confirm that only chimpanzees (most clearly in
the LPR condition) and 7-year old children (most clearly in theMPR
condition) responded to the social experience by becoming more
prosocial.
Discussion
Phase 1 of our study revealed that members of all three species we
studied may choose prosocial options in the social context we
employed, but in each case such responses were conditional rather
than universal. We discuss results for each species in turn and com-
pare them, before addressing the results of the social experience
intervention Phases 2 and 3.
The results for children indicate that prosocial responses in such
donor scenarios are slow to develop. The younger children’s failure to
exhibit a prosocial tendency towards another child who was sitting
close to them, and the older children’s failure to do so if they them-
selves would obtain a less preferred reward, are striking demonstra-
tions that even in our species, the emergence of such demanding
forms of prosociality are late developing and somewhat fragile.
Some elements of prosociality, including forms of helping and shar-
ing behavior, have been identified in early childhood and
infancy7,35–37, but our results are consistent with those of other recent
studies suggesting that other aspects of prosocial behavior, such as
the one we study here, are far from being fully developed even by the
age of 7–8 years12,13,38. Only in adults did we find unconditional
prosocial choices as the typical response, with a preferred reward
being delivered to the Receiver even when the Proposer themselves
gained only a less-preferred reward. We discuss this aspect further
below because we found similar conditional effects in the chimpan-
zees as in the older children.
Our Phase 1 results for chimpanzees are the first to reveal prosocial
responses in this paradigm, contrasting with the earlier studies that
elicited no such effect4,5,29. Surprisingly, our positive results were
obtained in the same primate center as the original study that found
no prosocial disposition4. Perhaps the most obvious of the few dif-
ferences in our methodologies was that, in our study, the Receiver
could gain either a more preferred or a less preferred reward (as
modeled on the capuchin study of Lakshminarayanan and
Santos32), as opposed to receiving a reward versus no-reward. This
may have affected the Proposers’ understanding of the consequences
of their actions, although why the contrasts should be in this dir-
ection remains unclear. Another important difference is that we
included a self-centered condition. This is important to establish
understanding of the apparatus by the chimpanzees, yet was absent
in the original study, making the results ambiguous. This could also
explain why our findings are consistent with the more recent results
of a modified version of this paradigm in which chimpanzees also
expressed prosocial choices when choosing between tokens that
could later be exchanged for food, rather than interacting with food
items that were directly before them31.
The latter results may bear on the effect we found in both the older
children and chimpanzees, where prosocial choices were made when
the Proposer received the preferred reward (theMPR condition), but
not when the Receiver would gain a preferred reward while the
Proposer would gain only a less-preferred one (the LPR condition).
A plausible explanation for this is an aversion to disadvantageous
inequity; Proposersmay have hesitated tomake a choice in which the
Receiver gained a more preferred reward than the Proposer33,39. It
could be that the token-based approach of Horner, et al.31 mentally
distanced participants from this consideration, whereas our
approach allowed for an easy comparison. There is evidence for a
sensitivity to disadvantageous inequity in a diversity of other experi-
mental paradigms and contexts, in both chimpanzees and other non-
human primates24,40, as well as in children, sometimes from an early
age10,41,42.
However, inequity aversion could not have been too strong, or we
would have expected to find that prosocial choices would be signifi-
cantly lower in the LPR context than the 50% expected in the empty
condition. We did not find such an effect in any of our analyses, for
any species. The interesting difference between classic inequity aver-
sion studies and our prosocial test that likely explains this is that in
the former studies, the participant and another individual received
the unequal resource offers from a third party, which can elicit strong
protest and agonistic responses towards that party43. By contrast, in
the LPR inequity condition of our dyadic prosocial paradigm, it is the
Proposer who has direct control over whether or not itmakes an offer
that is to the advantage of the Receiver. Moreover the Proposer will
get the same reward, whichever option it chooses. The lack of res-
ponses to inequity thus seems understandable and not in conflict
with strong effects demonstrated in quite different contexts.
We also found a conditional expression of prosociality in our
capuchin sample. Our Phase 1 results for capuchins did not reveal
evidence of prosocial responses in this paradigm. However, our sus-
picion that the presence of food rewards in the direct gaze of
Proposers acted as a prepotent stimulus, distracting them from
potential prosocial choices, was confirmed by delaying the
Proposer’s reward until after they chose an option for the Receiver.
In this context, prosocial choices emerged. These results are consist-
ent with prior evidence of prosocial tendencies using this paradigm32,
and more particularly, with the results of a study similar to that of
Horner, et al.31, in which capuchins preferentially chose whichever of
two tokens would be followed by rewards for both self and another
capuchin sitting in an adjacent compartment, rather than a token
that meant a reward only for self44.
Turning to the findings of the intervention of Phase 2, as tested in
Phase 3, our results showed that social experience of prosocial beha-
vior increased the prosocial responses of chimpanzees and seven-
year-old children who had not hitherto shown significant prosoci-
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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ality. Interestingly, this effect was not seen in the younger children,
suggesting that by seven years old, children either already display
prosocial dispositions, or are otherwise at a stage of receptivity to
social experiences in this domain. Those already acting prosocially
may thus already have been shaped by such experiences in their
everyday lives.
We believe we are the first to demonstrate these effects, which are
consistent with two fundamental processes that tend to be examined
in rather separate scientific literatures. First, our results meet the
criteria of social learning, defined in a widely accepted way as ‘‘learn-
ing that is influenced by observation of, or interaction with, another
animal (typically a conspecific) or its products’’45. It is the second
(interaction), rather than the first aspect (observation) in this defini-
tion that would be in play in our experiments: as noted in our intro-
duction, a triadic context would be necessary for a subject to learn
from observing the prosocial responses of a second individual
towards a third, whereas our subjects must have learned directly
from the behavior of another individual towards them. The second
process consistent with our results is the generalized reciprocity
noted in our introduction, in which individuals that experienced
prosocial acts directed towards them by one individual are more
likely to act in this way towards other individuals. Our results match
Figure 2 | Prosocial responses before and after social experience. The Y-axis represents the proportion of MPR pulled by the Proposer for the Receiver
and the bars are marginal mean and standard deviation estimated from the statistical model. Graphs column 1, MPR for Proposer; column 2: LPR for
Proposer. Before Social Experience (BSE) 5 prosocial response before exposure to the prosocial model; After Social Experience (ASE) 5 prosocial
response after experience of a prosocial other. Blue chart bars 5 significantly different to BSE condition. Green-framed graphs indicate a significant
increase in prosocial response (ASE. BSE). Statistically significant differences are indicated by stars, with statistics on the right. Other conventions as for
Fig. 1. Drawings by Jason Zampol.
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this formulation, since we ensured that any Receiver in the tests of
Phase 3 was not the individual who had acted as the prosocial
Proposer towards that subject in Phase 2.
Our resultsmake novel and substantial contributions in relation to
both of these important processes. First, an explosion of recent stud-
ies has documented social learning in children, chimpanzees, capu-
chins and other primates, but principally in the context of learning
about objects and the physical world, rather than about social beha-
vior14,15,20,46–48. Conversely, much recent research has addressed a
range of prosocial dispositions in children and non-human primates,
from helping to food sharing6–11,34,49, but their dependence on the
influence of others has been only rarely assessed, even in chil-
dren50–53, and these studies have not covered the resource-donation
which was our focus. The same is true of the handful of studies
indicating social influences on social actions, such as reconciliation
and affiliation, among non-human primates22,23.
Evidence adduced for generalized reciprocity in non-human ani-
mals is even rarer, and hitherto has been reported in only a single
study of rats54. A recent substantial article, demonstrating through
modeling that prosociality can evolve through state-dependent, gen-
eralized reciprocity28, cites only this one empirical study. Our results,
consistent with generalized altruism for both children and chimpan-
zees, provide the first such evidence for non-human primates.
Generalized reciprocity can thrive and evolve where helping or dona-
Figure 3 | Prosocial responses of chimpanzees, humans and capuchins after the social learning phase. Graphs column 1: More Preferred Rewards
(MPR) for the Proposer. Graphs column 2: Less Preferred Rewards (LPR) for the Proposer. Empty (E) 5 Receiver absent; Prosocial (P) 5 Receiver
present; Self (S)5 Self-centered scenario, with Receiver absent and Proposer having access to rewards delivered to Receiver compartment. Blue chart bars
5 significantly different to Empty condition. Graphs framed in green show a significant prosocial response (Prosocial. Empty). Statistically significant
differences are in bold and indicated by stars and statistics given on the right. Drawings by Jason Zampol.
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tion acts as a cue to the level of prosociality in the community one
resides in, and although direct reciprocation was not possible within
our experimental design, other forms of prosocial donation are likely
in the communities we studied, such as grooming services in the case
of the non-human primates. These could constitute the broader
social contexts in which generalized reciprocal dispositions could
be selected for. In the wild, in a chimpanzee community that shows
high levels of meat consumption involving large shareable packages
(monkeys), as much as 38% of meat-sharing was classed as ‘active’ in
the sense that the owner was prepared to facilitate the transfer of
meat to an individual actively requesting it, by tearing off pieces and
offering them55. Such social contexts may also include both direct
and downstream reciprocity, whichNowak andRoch25 showed could
facilitate generalized reciprocity (called upstream reciprocity by
these authors).
Whether generalized reciprocity is evident in monkeys remains a
more open question that has been little addressed. Majolo et al.56
found good evidence of direct reciprocity in macaque grooming
exchanges, but more patchy evidence for downstream indirect reci-
procity and no evidence for generalized reciprocity; likewise, we
found no evidence for effects of receiving prosocial donations on
capuchinmonkey’s prosocial acts towards others in our experiments.
Overall, our results confirm that the paradigm used is a demand-
ing one, not eliciting prosocial responses even in all seven year olds,
and not in all circumstances, even for those offering prosocial res-
ponses. It is important to recognize, however, that other, apparently
less demanding forms of prosociality, such as consolation, helping
and cooperation may be displayed more commonly in non-human
primates6 and in children from infancy7,35–37.
The results for Phase 3 may be regarded as an additional instance
of conditionality: subjects gathered information about the willing-
ness of others to act prosocially. Subsequent to experiencing receipt
of multiple prosocial donations of the more preferred of two visible
rewards, both chimpanzees and older children who had not dis-
played a significant degree of prosociality did so. Whether described
as social learning or generalized reciprocity, such a response has been
shown by theoretical modeling to be evolutionarily viable through
positive selection25,26,28. Such an effect is predicted to be stronger
when participants experience relatively prosocial responses from
multiple individuals. While we could expose participants to a max-
imum of two prosocial models in Phase 2, this will be important to
test further. From a social learning perspective, such an effect would
be consistent with recent evidence for conformist social transmis-
sion, involving adopting the most commonly perceived responses in
the population, in both chimpanzees and children14,57–59.
Methods
Apparatus. For the chimpanzees our ‘Shelfish’ apparatus was adapted from that used
previously by Silk, et al.4 and Vonk, et al.29. The apparatus consisted of two shelves
made of clear Lexan (L3W3H: 793 903 45 cm)whichwere positioned in front of
the chimpanzee enclosure, with one side allocated to the Proposer and one to the
Receiver. From each position (Proposer or Receiver) four rewards were visible, two
located on the upper shelf (one on the Proposer side and one on the Receiver side),
and two located directly below on the lower shelf. In their starting position the shelves
were positioned out of reach, such that the rewards could not be obtained directly. In
order to obtain a reward the Proposer had to pull one of two ropes (which could be
accessed from the Proposer’s side only) which allowed the food rewards on the
selected shelf to be brought towards the Proposer and the Receiver. The Proposer was
only allowed to bring one shelf within reach; as one shelf was pulled, the other one
automatically retracted.
For the capuchin study the Shelfish apparatus was scaled down appropriately (L3
W 3 H: 50 3 653 25 cm) and modeled on that used previously by
Lakshminarayanan and Santos32. During the experiment, the apparatus was placed
against two research cubicles that the capuchins are used to sitting in for cognitive
testing (one Proposer cubicle, one Receiver cubicle). The shelves were positioned such
that the rewards could not be obtained by reaching into the box directly, so to obtain
the rewards the Proposer had to reach into the box (through one of two holes in the
cubicle door) and pull a handle (L3W: 113 8 cm) that was attached to the front of
each shelf on the Proposer’s side.
The Shelfish apparatus used in the human studies was identical in structure to that
used for the capuchins but was slightly larger (apparatus: L 3W 3 H: 653 653
70 cm; shelves: L3W: 73 57 cm; handles: L3W: 113 8 cm). In order to create a
Proposer and a Receiver compartment equivalent to that of the non-human primates,
the area directly in front of the apparatus was divided into two equally-sized com-
partments by attaching a transparent partition (L3H: 503 90 cm) perpendicular to
the front face of the box.
Participants. Chimpanzee participants were 16 individuals from four groups housed
at the Michale E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research, UT MD,
Anderson Cancer Center, Bastrop, Texas, USA. Twelve individuals (10 females and 2
males) were assigned to the Proposer role, and 4 individuals (all adult females) were
assigned to the Receiver role. An additional 2 individuals (1 male and 1 female) acted
as models for the 4 individuals (1 male and 3 females) who were re-tested after the
social experience phase. Approval for the study was gained from the UT MD
Anderson Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC approval number:
07-92-03887) and the Ethics Committee of the University of St Andrews’ School of
Psychology. Procedures were conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour and UT MD Anderson is fully
accredited by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory
Animal Care-International.
Capuchin participants were 14 individuals from two groups housed at the ‘Living
Links to Human Evolution’ Research Centre situated within the Royal Zoological
Society of Scotland’s Edinburgh Zoo, UK. Ten individuals (7 males and 3 females)
were assigned to the Proposer role, and 4 individuals (3 males and 1 female, all
juveniles) were assigned to the Receiver role. An additional 4 individuals (all male)
acted as models for the 6 individuals (3 males and 3 females) who were re-tested after
the social experience phase. All procedures were approved by the Royal Zoological
Society of Scotland and the Ethics Committee of the University of St Andrews’ School
of Psychology. Procedures were conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the
Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
The child study was conducted with 97 individuals recruited from two elementary
schools in Scotland, UK. Seventy-nine individuals (34 five-year-olds, mean age 61
months; and 45 seven-year-olds, mean age 92 months) were assigned to the Proposer
role, and 18 individuals (9males and 9 females) were assigned to the Receiver role. An
additional 22 children (12 males and 10 females) acted as models for the 19 five-year-
olds (11 males and 8 females) and 18 seven-year-olds (8 males and 10 females) who
were re-tested after the social experience phase.
The adult participants were 51 undergraduate students (mean age 21 years) from a
ScottishUniversity who took part in the study for course credit. Forty-one individuals
(20 males and 21 females) were assigned to the Proposer Role, and 10 individuals (5
males, 5 females) were assigned to the Receiver role. No social experience phase was
conducted with the adult participants due to the high baseline levels of prosociality.
Ethical approval for all of the human research was granted by the School of Life
Sciences ethics committee at Heriot Watt University, UK. Informed consent was
obtained directly from the adult participants and via the parents of the child parti-
cipants. All procedures were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and
regulations.
Procedures. Chimpanzee study. Training phase 1. The aim of the first training phase
was to ensure that the participants could distinguish between an MPR (a slice of
pineapple) and an LPR (a slice of carrot) on the Proposer’s side of the apparatus. This
phase additionally served to confirm that the chimpanzees preferred pineapple slices
to carrots. During this phase, the participants interacted with the box alone and were
allowed to access the Proposer’s side only. Every session, of every test always started
with familiarization trials in which a single MPR was placed on the Proposer side in
one location (top or bottom shelves) and then in the other location. This wasmeant to
reacquaint the participant with the working of the apparatus. The sessions consisted
of 10 trials in which an MPR and an LPR were placed on the shelves on both the
Proposer and the Receiver’s side. The placement of the reward started with the
Proposer side, with the top and bottom rewards placed at the same time and followed
by the placement of the rewards on the Receiver side (top and bottom shelves at the
same time) to attract the attention of the participant to the rewards on the Receiver
side of the apparatus (see supplementary videos of each experiment for more details
regarding the setup). The placement of the rewards on the top and bottom shelves was
counterbalanced, at this stage and in following phases. Participants were trained using
this procedure until they made at least 16 retrievals of the MPR from the Proposer’s
side in two consecutive sessions (out of 20 trials; at least 80% success).
Training phase 2. The second training phase aimed to ensure that the participants
were capable of attending to the value of the rewards on both the Proposer’s and
Receiver’s sides of the apparatus. This was achieved by allowing the chimpanzees to
access the rewards from both the Proposer’s and the Receiver’s side. The rewards
available on the Proposer’s side were always identical (two LPRs or two MPRs),
whereas the rewards on the Receiver’s side always differed (one LPR and one MPR).
In order to obtain the maximum payoff, the participants had to attend to the value of
the rewards on the Receiver’s side. Participants were trained using this procedure
until they made at least 16 retrievals of the MPR from the Receiver’s side in two
consecutive sessions (out of 20 trials; at least 80% success).
Testing Phase 1-Prosocial Baseline. The first testing phase occurred immediately
after the training phase and comprised three conditions: two control conditions
(empty control and self-centered control), and a prosocial test condition. Each par-
ticipant performed two sessions of 10 trials of each condition, with order of condi-
tions randomized. This was followed by another set of two sessions of each condition
re-ordered pseudo-randomly so that the last session of the first test was not identical
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to the first session of the second test (in other words, individuals were never exposed
to 40 trials of the same condition). Each participant therefore received a total of 120
trials (40 prosocial, 40 empty and 40 self-centered). In both control conditions the
participants interacted with the apparatus individually. The difference between the
two conditions was that a barrier (partition or wall) was present in the empty control
condition, allowing the participant to access the rewards on the Proposer’s side only,
whereas the barrier was removed in the self-centered control condition, allowing the
participants access to both the Proposer and Receiver sides.
In the prosocial test condition Proposers were tested with a group mate in the
Receiver compartment. In the together condition, Proposer and Receiver were in the
same room, with no barrier between them. To make sure that they remained in their
respective roles we trained them to receive the rewards from their position and
removed the apparatus from reach if one or the other tried to reach for the reward on
the other side.
In each of the three conditions, the trials comprised two different pay-off structures
presented in a pseudo-randomly counterbalanced sequence within each session of 10
trials (the number of successive trials of the same type did not exceed three): fiveMPR
trials and five LPR trials. In the LPR trials (LPR & LPR versus LPR & MPR) and the
MPR trials (MPR&MPR versus LPR&MPR), the outcome for the Proposer side was
identical irrespective of which shelf they chose to pull. However, the choice of shelf
influenced the outcome for the Receiver, with the Proposer having the option of
delivering either a MPR or a LPR to the Receiver’s side.
Testing phase 2-Social experience. Once the initial level of prosociality had been
established, the participants entered the social experience phase in which they were
placed in the Receiver compartment, with a new ‘prosocial’ individual on the
Proposer side. In order to ensure that the prosocial model would deliver the MPR on
every trial, the shelf with the LPR on the Receiver’s side was locked in place (by
securing the shelf to the frame of the apparatus) so that it could not be brought
forward. The participants completed 4 sessions (40 trials in total) in which a pre-
trained model was in the role of Proposer and the test participant was in the role of
Receiver. The order of the trials was determined using the same pseudo-randomi-
zation procedure as in Testing phase 1.
Testing phase 3-Prosocial Re-test.On completion of the social experience phase, the
test participants were re-positioned on the Proposer’s side of the box and re-tested
with the same Receiver from phase 1. The participants were again tested in the three
different conditions (empty, self-centered and prosocial) to determine whether any
increase in prosociality was a result of being exposed to the prosocial model, rather
than the participants simply pulling the highest value shelf more often. Each block of
trials was presented in an order determined according to the same procedure as
before, for a total of 60 trials (two consecutive sessions of 10 trials per condition).
Testing phases two and three were performed with the chimpanzees in the together
condition and not in the separate condition because the design of the housing facility
prevented us from completing these two phases with the latter chimpanzees.
Capuchin study. The procedure for the capuchin study mirrored that of the chim-
panzees almost exactly. As with the chimpanzees, each Proposer was required tomeet
criterion (80% success) in both training phases (using papaya as MPR and pellets as
LPR), before completing 120 trials (40 prosocial, 40 empty and 40 self-centered) in the
first experimental phase (10 trials per session). Those individuals who proceeded to
the social experience phase received theMPR from either a single model, or from two
models, for a total of 40 trials, before being re-tested with their original Receiver (60
trials in total, 20 prosocial, 20 empty and 20 self-centered). Every session, of every test
also started with familiarization trials in which a single MPR was successively placed
in one of the four possible locations (top or bottom shelves on the Proposer or
Receiver side). This was meant to reacquaint the participant with the working of the
apparatus.
Study on the conditional prosocial response of capuchin monkeys: We decided to
explore three factors that could potentially explain the origin of the variability in
prosocial tendency observed in capuchin monkeys. (i) A large difference between the
MPR and LPR could limit the tendency of Proposers to give theMPR to Receivers (ii)
On the contrary, the difference in quality between theMPR and LPR on the Receiver’s
side may not be well recognized (iii) Finally, it is possible that the presence of two
MPR facing the Proposer distracted him/her from the Receiver’s side of the apparatus
and this masked the effect that could be revealed if the food was not visible.
These experiments were conducted more than 6 months after the end of the first
study, from June 2012 to August 2012. Eight capuchins that were tested in the
previous study took part with their original Receivers.
Training phase: One training session of 10 trials was used to enable the capuchins to
accustom themselves to the apparatus once more. A reward was randomly placed in
one of the 4 possible locations with the partition open. We randomly permutated the
sequence of four locations three times to obtain a succession of 12 locations that we
then cut to 10 (each location was therefore sampled at least twice). The goal was to
ensure that the participants could remember which shelf they needed to pull to get the
reward. The following test phases started with 4 familiarization trials, as in the
previous study. The participants completed 2 sessions of 10 trials in in each testing
phase.
Testing phase 1: reduction of the difference between MPR and LPR. The purpose of
this first phase was to see if a reduction in the difference between the MPR and LPR
would influence the level of prosociality. Capuchins prefer raisins to pellets and
papaya to raisins, so we decided to use raisins as a LPR instead of pellets and kept all
other procedures and settings identical to the prosocial test phase.
Testing phase 2: absence of LPR on the Receiver side. The purpose of the second
testing phase was to evaluate the importance of the presence of the LPR on the
Receiver side. The procedure was identical to the previous phase except that the LPR
on the Receiver side was removed. The Proposer therefore had the choice between
raisin/nothing vs. raisin/papaya in the LPR trials, and papaya/papaya vs. papaya/
nothing in the MPR trials.
Testing phase 3: Capuchins delayed condition. Before performing testing phase 3,
Proposers were trained to experience a delay in receiving their reward. First during 2
sessions (20 trials), the partition was open and aMPR was available to the participant
on either the top or the bottom shelf on the Receiver side. There was no reward on the
Proposer side, however, immediately after having pulled one shelf (whether or not it
bore a reward), the experimenter handed a MPR to the participant on the Proposer
side. The participant therefore could not access theMPR on the Proposer side directly
and experienced a short delay in receiving the reward from the experimenter. After
these 20 trials, the partition was closed again and a MPR was placed in the now
inaccessible Receiver cubicle. As soon as the participant pulled one of the two shelves,
the experimenter rewarded the participant with a MPR. This training was performed
for 2 sessions of 10 trials. Once the participants had completed training, they were
paired with their original Receiver (partition closed) for two sessions of 10 trials and
only one MPR was placed on the Receiver’s side. The Proposers were rewarded by a
MPR every time they pulled one of the shelves.
Post-test: After completion of the three testing phases, the participants performed
two control conditions equivalent to the empty and self-centered controls described
previously. In the first 2 control sessions (the delayed empty control) the partitionwas
closed, the Receiver was absent and a MPR was placed on the Receiver’s side. The
following 2 control sessions (the delayed self-centered control) were identical to those
presented previously with the exception that the partition was open, allowing the
participant to access the reward on the Receiver’s side. During all these trials, the
participants were rewarded for pulling one of the two shelves with a MPR.
Child Study. The procedure for the child study aimed to replicate that for the non-
human primates as closely as possible, whilst acknowledging the practicalities of
working with children. These considerations led to several minor procedural changes
for the child participants. Throughout each phase, the food rewards were replaced
with a colorful sticker (MPR) and a plainwhite sticker (LPR). Stickers were used as the
rewards in order to comply with school and parental preferences. The use of stickers
as rewards is commonplace in developmental psychology and previous studies have
shown that children are highly motivated by stickers. We are therefore confident that
the rewards used for each species, although different, were motivating in each case.
The children were asked to complete fewer trials and participate in fewer sessions
than the non-human primates, as is common in comparative research of this nature.
The training and baseline testing phase were conducted in a single 30-minute session,
with the social experience and prosocial re-test occurring in a single 30-minute session
one week later. Following the training phase (criterion for each phase was two con-
secutive successes in a maximum of eight trials given that the working of the apparatus
is transparent for children), the children were presented with a total of 18 trials divided
into 3 counter-balanced blocks (6 empty, 6 self-centered, and 6 prosocial). Those
individuals who proceeded to the social experience phase (delivered,5 MPRs from a
maximum of 6 at baseline) assumed the role of Receiver with two different prosocial
models for a total of 8 trials. In order to ensure that the child models appeared to be
delivering the MPR through choice, rather than being forced to do so, we pre-trained
the child models to deliver the rewards with both shelves unlocked. On completion of
the social experience phase, the participants were re-tested in the phase 1 configura-
tion with the order of the three conditions re-randomized.
Adult study. The procedure of the adult study was identical in every respect to the child
study with the exception that the rewards were coins (MPR 5 50 UK pence; LPR 5 20
UK pence) rather than stickers. Due to the high baseline level of prosociality we docu-
mented for adults, no social experience phase was conducted with these adult participants.
Statistical procedures. Given that our response variable was binary (‘prosocial’ or
‘not prosocial’ choice), we used a binomial generalized estimating equation model60
(GEE), with logit link function, to analyze the data (see Supplementary information
for additional details). The GEE approach represents an extension of Generalized
Linear Models (GLM) for the analysis of repeated measurement data and other non-
independent data. Compared to Generalized Linear Mixed Models (GLMM), the
focus of GEE is on estimating the population effects (marginal model) rather than the
regression parameters (conditional model) that would enable prediction of the effect
for a given individual. In our study, non-independence could arise from different
levels (repeated measurements, several group levels such as school and classroom for
instance, etc.) and the use of GEE allowed us to use the same statistical technique for
each species and study, while still taking into account different levels of non-
independence. However, given that GEE and GLMM are recently developed
statistical methods that are still relatively new to the field61,62, we also conducted our
analyses using GLMM. Since we obtained qualitatively similar results with GEE and
GLMM, we report only the results from the GEE.
All the statistical comparisons performed were planned and follow logically from
the design of the experiments, so we report exact, uncorrected, p-values.
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